University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 1

Article 7

2012

Family Law—Egg Donation and Stem Cell Research—Eggs for
Sale: The Scrambled State of Legislation in the Human Egg
Market
Kitty L. Cone

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Family Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Science and Technology
Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kitty L. Cone, Family Law—Egg Donation and Stem Cell Research—Eggs for Sale: The Scrambled State of
Legislation in the Human Egg Market, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 189 (2012).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

FAMILY LAW—EGG DONATION AND STEM CELL RESEARCH—EGGS FOR
SALE: THE SCRAMBLED STATE OF LEGISLATION IN THE HUMAN EGG
MARKET

I. INTRODUCTION
The world has seen the rapid rise of numerous medical technologies
that were outside the realm of possibility just a few decades ago.1 These
developing technologies, although generally providing incredible enhancement to our lives, have also created an equally incredible legal tangle.2 Couples who would never have had children in earlier times are now able to
reproduce with the help of science—and a host of doctors, donors, and middlemen who are involved in the process.3 A survey of existing legislation
reveals a glaring disparity in how human eggs4 are currently regulated in the
United States depending on the purpose for which they are used.5 Human
eggs are harvested and used for two purposes: reproduction and research
(stem-cell and human cloning); both of which must essentially compete for
eggs from a small pool of willing donors.6 Egg donors7 are compensated
very differently depending on the intended use for their eggs: donors for
reproductive purposes may receive substantial compensation, whereas egg
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part II; see also SCOTT CARNEY, THE RED MARKET 113 (2011). “The business features well-meaning doctors alongside assembly-line charlatans, desperate parents,
and unlikely entrepreneurs, all competing for one source of raw materials: women of
childbearing age.” Id.
4. BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 480 (42d ed. 2010). A human egg or oocyte is “[a]n
immature ovum.” Id. See also ASSESSING THE MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION
FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP REPORT, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL 14 (Linda Giudice, Eileen Santa & Robert Pool, eds., 2007) [hereinafter
IOM Report] (explaining that “[w]hen a baby girl is born, her ovaries contain roughly 2 million oocytes, each encased in a protective covering called a follicle”). “At the time of a woman’s first menstrual period, she still has 400,000 or so of these primordial follicles, and by the
time of menopause they are almost all gone . . .” Id.
5. See infra Appendix A: Fifty State Survey of Egg Donation, Stem-Cell, and Human
Cloning Legislation [hereinafter Fifty State Survey]. Westlaw search criteria: ova or egg or
oocyte /p compensation; oocyte /p consideration; “human egg” /p consideration or compensation; embryo & “stem cell” or “human cloning.”
6. See infra Part II.
7. The word “donor” is misleading because it implies a charitable gift. See Thomas
Murray, New Reproductive Technologies and the Family, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES
51, 64 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996) (“Despite the repeated references to donors of both
ovum and sperm, paying individuals for their biological products makes them vendors, not
donors,” thus placing “the interactions between the parties squarely in the marketplace.”).
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donors for research generally do not receive any compensation.8 Existing
legislation reflects a prevalent unwillingness to condone payment for eggs
used for research, particularly human cloning, because large quantities of
human embryos are manipulated and destroyed in the research process.9 The
public’s repugnance toward human cloning, often motivated by misconceptions or individual moral viewpoints, has resulted in a crazy quilt of state
and national legislation that gives bad actors wide latitude to engage in improper or unethical treatment of both donors and recipients of donor eggs.10
Few states have enacted legislation to protect egg donors; there are no
systematic regulations to ensure that donors and recipients are fully informed about the risks of the egg harvesting procedures—which are considerable—and, consequently, there is little case law to provide guidance to
courts in fashioning a remedy.11 Mounting evidence shows that the eggharvesting procedure is far riskier than was previously thought and can
cause women to suffer serious complications, including ovarian torsion,
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, massive fluid build-up in the abdominal
cavity, miscarriages, blood clots, stroke, sterility, renal failure, and death,
causing many clinicians and commentators to question whether it is even
possible for donors to give “informed consent.”12 These complications are
particularly alarming in light of the fact that donors are chosen because they
are in good health prior to donation.13
Although commentators have examined various legal, moral, and ethical issues involved with eggs used for reproductive purposes or for stem cell
research, the intertwined relationship between these markets has largely
been ignored.14 Many commentators now agree that the long-term risks to
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part II.D and Part III.A; see also Ronald Chester & Robert Sackstein,
Embryonic Stem Cell-Based Therapeutics: Balancing Scientific Progress and Bioethics, 20
HEALTH MATRIX 203, 207–16 (2010) (analyzing whether “4-6 day old human embryos” used
in stem-cell and human-cloning research are human beings from various religious, moral, and
scientific perspectives and discussing the often polarizing controversy surrounding this question).
10. See infra Part II.D and Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Simón Marina et al., Oocyte Donor Selection From 554 Candidates, 14 HUMAN
REPROD. 2770, 2774 (1999) (“[Y]ounger women are more altruistic, have had fewer sexual
partners, and have a lower risk of venereal disease. According to our experience, the student
receiving economic compensation is the most suitable donor and the one that recipients accept best.”); Jennifer Schneider, Fatal Colon Cancer in a Young Egg Donor: A Physician
Mother’s Call for Follow-up and Research on the Long-term Risks of Ovarian Stimulation,
90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1.e1, 1.e1 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Lisa Hird Chung, Free Trade in Human Reproductive Cells: A Solution to
Procreative Tourism and the Unregulated Internet, 15 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 263, 265 (2006);
Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 1203, 1257 (2009);
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donors are substantial and that existing regulation is insufficient to protect
women from exploitation or unethical practices, such as fraud, mishandling
or destruction of embryos, misrepresentation or deception about the risks
involved with the harvesting process, egg swapping or stealing, predatory
advertising, and failure to disclose conflicts of interest.15
Another growing concern is that providers and clinics often outsource
the recruitment of donors to independent egg brokers who are not subject to
ethical guidelines.16 Because independent egg brokers and egg donor agencies are not clinics or physicians, they are not required to join a professional
organization that provides ethical guidelines for appropriate conduct, such
as the American Medical Association (AMA), American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), or the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART).17 For this reason, these entities are able to bypass regulations, and the providers or clinics that utilize their services are not directly
tainted by ethical or fraudulent activity.18

Pamela Foohey, Paying Women for Their Eggs for Use in Stem Cell Research, 30 PACE L.
REV. 900, 903 (2010); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of
Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 603 (2003); J. Brad Reich & Dawn
Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg
Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2010); O. Carter Snead,
Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1530
(2010); Ann Bindu Thomas, Avoiding Embryos “R” Us: Toward a Regulated Fertility Industry, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 247 (2008); Andrew Zacher, Oocyte Donor Compensation for Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Analysis of New York’s “Payment for Eggs Program,” 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 323, 323 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, Ethics,
and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation To Protect Women’s Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 193, 194 (2008); Rev. Phillip C. Cato, The Hidden Costs of Fertility, 20 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEG. COMMENT. 45, 53 (2005); Justine Durrell, Women’s Eggs: Exceptional Endings, 22
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 188 (2011); M. Elliott Neal, Protecting Women: Preserving
Autonomy in the Commodification of Motherhood, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 611, 616
(2011); Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building A Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 41, 41 (2009); Lisa M. Luetkemeyer, Comment, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse
and What Are They Doing with the Eggs (and Sperm)? A Call for Increased Regulation of
Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 397, 399 (2010); Yaniv Heled, Note, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated
Reproductive Tissue—The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
243, 267 (2010).
16. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lahl, President, The Center for Bioethics and
Culture Network (Oct. 28, 2011).
17. See infra note 22 and accompanying text; Melissa Reynolds, Note, How Old Is Too
Old?: The Need for Federal Regulation Imposing A Maximum Age Limit on Women Seeking
Infertility Treatments, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 293 (2010).
18. E.g., Mark Hansen, . . . and Baby Makes Litigation: As Surrogacy Becomes More
Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, 97 A.B.A. J. 52, 56 (Mar. 2011) (reporting on one of
the biggest fertility scandals).
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In addition, there is little information or scholarly research exploring
the growing role that fertility clinics, egg-donation agencies, and private
brokers play in shaping the market for human eggs within the United
States.19 Currently, only one state—California—directly regulates fertility
clinics,20 supporting the conclusion that “supervising certain commercial
aspects of the fertility industry” has “generally . . . escaped the sustained
attention of federal and state officials.”21 This conclusion is further supported by the lack of case law arising from donors who suffered serious complications or were subjected to unethical practices,22 despite increasing evidence demonstrating the frequency at which these complications occur.23
Some commentators theorize that one reason providers choose to engage in
unethical behavior, whether directly or indirectly (through brokers or agencies), is because the guidelines put forth by the ASRM are not mandatory,
and there are no penalties for failure to comply, with the exception of California.24
This article presents a compelling argument that comprehensive legislation addressing the procurement of human eggs used for research and re19. See Lahl, supra note 16.
20. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California; see also Cato, supra note 15, at
49 (citing Stacey A. Huse, The Need for Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 35 U. OF
LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 555, 558 (1996/97)).
21. See Noah, supra note 14, at 616.
22. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of
Oocyte Donors, 40 HASTINGS CTR. R. 25, 28–33 (2010) (discussing evidence that egg donor
agencies do not comply with ASRM guidelines for donor compensation).
23. See infra Part II. There are several reasons for these complications. Donors who
experience serious complications may be paid to settle in order to avoid negative publicity or
jeopardizing the physician’s medical license. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Damages at
1, Papademas v. Pac. Fertility Med. Grp. (No. 315913), 2002 WL 34141522, at *1 (Cal.
Super. 2002) [hereinafter Papademas]; see also H. Mertes & G. Pennings, Oocyte Donation
for Stem Cell Research, 22 HUM. REPROD. 629, 633 (2007) (reporting studies where “malpractices ranging from denying a promised anesthesia during oocyte retrieval and denying
follow-up care to intimidation by physicians and the absence of informed consent”). Donors
who experience significant side effects, but not serious enough to encourage settlement, often
face an uphill battle to win a medical malpractice action against the physician and fertility
clinic that treated them. See, e.g., Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d
146, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (detailing an egg-stealing scandal where doctors stole
eggs/pre-embryos from over three hundred victims); Dubont v. Cornell Univ., No. G026598,
2002 WL 536020, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2002); Stone v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 92
Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (outlining charges of egg stealing against two fertility doctors; one was later arrested in Mexico after fleeing the United States to avoid arrest). It
is often very difficult for medical malpractice actions to succeed. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo
Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
24. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2; Levine, supra note 22, at 25–33. For a review
of ASRM guidelines currently in place, see ASRM Ethics Committee Reports & Statements,
http://www.asrm.org/EthicsReports/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); ASRM Practice Committee
Guidelines, http://www.asrm.org/Guidelines/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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productive purposes is needed within the United States to protect women
from exploitation and unethical practices.25 Currently, many states have either no legislative guidelines in place or only address eggs used for research
purposes, while remaining silent on eggs used for reproductive purposes.26
No state has yet enacted comprehensive legislation addressing eggs used for
both research and reproductive purposes.27 Because this topic is complex
and uses a specialized vocabulary and concepts that are not part of common
knowledge, Part II discusses Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) procedures that are being used and the demand for these procedures that is currently shaping the global market for human eggs.
Part III presents an overview of the current inadequate state legislation
regarding eggs used both for research and for reproductive purposes in all
fifty states, and it analyzes the existing gaps. This overview will focus on six
critical problems: disparate compensation based on the intended use of the
eggs, lack of informed consent, conflicts of interest, predatory advertising,
donor-screening procedures, and the disposition of surplus or leftover eggs.
The scope of this note is limited to current legislative approaches taken
among the fifty states and does not discuss regulatory oversight by federal
agencies or federal regulations that have largely been ineffective in addressing these problems within the fertility industry, due to lack of enforcement. 28
While federal regulation may be desirable and certainly would be the most
comprehensive solution, the Supreme Court of the United States has historically shown a clear preference for allowing the states to experiment and try
to hammer out a solution.29 Part IV examines possible legislative solutions,
and Part V offers recommendations.

25. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See id.
28. For an overview of existing agencies, regulations, or associations that monitor various aspects of the ART industry see Bercovici, supra note 15, at 198–202; Heled, supra note
15, at 267–80; Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 23–30.
29. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “one of the happy incidents of the federal system” was that a state
could “serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993)) (discussing “the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core police powers have
always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of their citizens.”).
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II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
The number of children conceived using donated reproductive tissue
continues to rise substantially every year.30 Assisted reproductive technologies (ART) encompass a number of procedures such as in vitro fertilization
(IVF), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), gamete intrafallopian transfer
(GIFT), and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI).31 The Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) defines ART as “all clinical treatments
and laboratory procedures—including the handling of human oocytes and
sperm, or embryos—conducted with the intent of conceiving.”32 ART does
not refer to “treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., artificial insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved.”33 Approximately twelve percent of all ART cycles performed in the United
States use donated eggs.34
ART is highly desirable because it gives infertile couples the ability to
conceive a genetic child using donated eggs.35 The term “genetic children”
refers to the use of at least one parent’s genetic material (whether sperm or
eggs) in the reproduction process, as opposed to an adopted child that has no

30. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (noting that “[i]n 2009, there
were 441 reporting clinics that performed 146,244 cycles, which resulted in 45,870 live
births, and 60,190 infants” and “over 1% of all infants born in the U.S. every year are conceived using ART”). See also Appendix B: Glossary of Terms Used in This Report, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/appixb.htm#L (last visited
Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter CDC Glossary]. The CDC Glossary defines an ART cycle as “a
process in which (1) an ART procedure is performed, (2) a woman has undergone ovarian
stimulation or monitoring with the intent of having an ART procedure, or (3) frozen embryos
have been thawed with the intent of transferring them to a woman.” Id. “A cycle begins when
a woman begins taking fertility drugs or having her ovaries monitored for follicle production.” Id. A “live birth” is defined as “the delivery of one or more infants with any signs of
life.” Id.
31. Infertility
FAQ’s,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Infertility/index.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
32. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30.
33. See Jonathan B. Pitt, Fragmenting Procreation, 108 YALE L.J. 1893, 1893–97
(1999).
34. 2009 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates National Summary and Fertility Clinic Report, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., 60 (2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART_2009_Full.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ART Report].
35. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 106–07 (1999)
(discussing the importance our society places upon genetic offspring).
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biological relation to its adopted parents.36 For many people, the ability to
pass on their heritage or personal characteristics to their children is extremely important.37
ART’s increasing popularity over the last thirty years38 is due to a
number of cultural factors, such as society’s tendency to place increasing
importance on achieving educational goals and career progression.39 Many
women choose to wait until after age thirty-five to have children.40 Because
of this delay, the demand for ART technology has grown exponentially.41
Aided by the evolution of reproductive and personal privacy rights,42 it is
now possible for women to exercise greater control over their reproductive
destinies.43
Although the Constitution protects the fundamental right to procreate,
constitutional scholars are uncertain how the contours and limitations of this
right will evolve in the context of stem cell research, human cloning, in vitro
fertilization, and egg donation.44 Much will depend upon how the “principle
of procreative liberty” is interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States and whether the use of ART technology is entitled to “special consti-

36. See Suchitra Jittaun Satpathi, Gliding Over Treacherous Ice: Fulfillment and Responsibility in the New Reproductive Era; Why Contractual Ordering Is Appropriate, 18
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 58 (1999).
37. See Coleman, supra note 35, at 107.
38. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 65 (reporting that the number of ART cycles
performed in the U.S. increased over forty-six percent from 2000 to 2009).
39. Bradley J. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 379, 379
(2007); see also Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 865–66 (2007).
40. Kara N. Maxwell, Ina N. Cholst, & Zev Rosenwalks, The Incidence of Both Serious
and Minor Complications in Young Women Undergoing Oocyte Donation, 90 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 2165, 2165 (2008); see also Linda J. Heffner, Advanced Maternal Age–How Old is
Too Old? 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927, 1927 (2004).
41. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 65 (ART Trends 2000–2009).
42. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (holding that
“[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships . . . .”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942) (upholding a fundamental right to procreate).
43. See J. McGregor & F. Dreifuss-Netter, France and the United States: The Legal and
Ethical Differences in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), 26 MED. & L. 117, 117
(2007).
44. See Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57, 62 (2002); see also John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction,
Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490,
1490–1505 (2008).
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tutional protection.”45 As Professor Coleman remarked, “[u]ltimately,
whether ART should be considered part of procreative liberty is as much
about values and policy as it is about precedent.”46 The paucity of case law,
combined with the lack of legislative guidance in most states, is one factor
contributing to the rise of unethical behavior by some practitioners within
the fertility industry.47
A.

The Global Egg Market

In many developing countries, the lack of regulation and extreme poverty has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of fertility clinics
and brokers that cater to foreigners searching for IVF treatments. 48 The
global market for human eggs has grown exponentially as in vitro fertilization and stem cell technologies have become more widely available, creating
a “global shortage of human [oocytes].”49 The expansion of the global marketplace has created increased opportunities to exploit women, while exerting pressure on the market for eggs within the United States.50
1.

The Internet: New Opportunities for Reproductive Commerce

Increased mobility, unprecedented access to the Internet, and the international focus on globalization has led to significant opportunities for reproductive commerce.51 Within the fertility industry, the Internet acts as a conduit for communication between couples, clinics, and prospective egg donors, whether the couple is considering using a local clinic or traveling out45. See Coleman, supra note 44, at 60. “If . . . individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in making decisions about the use of some or all ARTs, any regulation of these
technologies would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.” Id. “Like all questions about
the scope of substantive due process protections, the concept of procreative liberty is susceptible to multiple interpretations, depending on the level of generality at which the principle is
defined.” Id. at 68.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 16–18, 23–24 and accompanying text.
48. Ruth Saunders and Zeynep Gürtin-Broadbent, Event Review: Making Babies in the
21st Century—The Rise of Reproductive Technologies, BIONEWS (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_81597.asp (last visited June 8, 2012).
49. Catherine Waldby, Oocyte Markets: Women’s Reproductive Work in Embryonic
Stem Cell Research, 27 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 19, 20 (2008); see also Thomas J.
Papadimos & Alexa T. Papadimos, The Student and the Ovum: The Lack of Autonomy and
Informed Consent in Trading Genes for Tuition, 2 REPROD. BIOLOGY & ENDOCRINOLOGY 56,
61 (2004).
50. See generally CARNEY, supra note 3 (discussing the global trade in body parts); see
also Waldby, supra note 49, at 19.
51. See Globalization, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story043/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); see also
Swink & Reich, supra note 39, at 863–69.

2012]

EGGS FOR SALE

197

side the United States to a country where the costs are lower and the regulations are minimal.52 Clinics use the internet to offer infertile and nontraditional couples the ability to “customize” a child based on particular
characteristics, such as height, eye color, hair color, or race.53 Prospective
recipients can sort through hundreds of donor profiles and pictures—much
like a dating website.54 Although the process is anonymous, some egg brokers “personalize” the experience by creating profiles for each egg donor
that lists their ethnicities, religion, eye color, hair color, height, age, build,
education level, talents, hobbies, location, and whether they have been pregnant before.55 The donor profile includes several pictures of the donor in
various poses, and may also include a video statement by the donor.56
2.

Twin Purposes for Human Eggs

Worldwide, human eggs are used for two principal purposes: reproduction (IVF) and research (stem-cell and cloning).57 The procedure for harvesting eggs is essentially the same for both; however, with stem cell research
the “aim of the donation is to advance medical knowledge rather than to
establish a pregnancy.”58 Egg donation or oocyte retrieval is a complicated
multi-step procedure that involves a multi-drug protocol59 with substantial
acute and long-term risks to both donor and recipient.60
52. Andrea Mechanick Braverman, How the Internet is Reshaping Assisted Reproduction: From Donor Offspring Registries to Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 11 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 477, 477 (2010).
53. Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2010, at C, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504576007774155273928.html.
54. Prospective parents can add donors to their wish list, much like placing an order on
Amazon.com, and then the broker will work with the parents to choose their “ideal” donor.
See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 52, at 477.
55. E.g., Egg Donor Wish List: Member Login, THE CTR. FOR HUMAN REPROD.,
https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/wl_search.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); FERTILITY
BRIDGES, http://www.fertilitybridges.com/eggdonordatabase.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
“Proven” donors are compensated more because the probability that a recipient will become
pregnant using their eggs is higher. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e1.
56. Egg Donor Wish List: Member Login, supra note 55.
57. See Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 629.
58. Id. (discussing the harvesting procedure for IVF reproduction and stem cell research).
59. See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, STANFORD UNIV.,
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2011). Donors generally receive three classes of drugs before their eggs are harvested:
Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone Agonist Analogues (GRHA), Follicle Stimulating Hormone (FSH) or Human Menopausal Gonadotropin (hMG), and Human Chorionic Gonadotropin (HCG). Id.
60. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 4.
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First, the donor takes a drug to stop ovulation and menstruation, inducing “artificial menopause.”61 Next, the donor begins daily injections of either
follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) or human menopausal gonadotropin
(hMG), which hyperstimulates the ovaries to maximize the number of eggs
produced.62 After the donor’s physician determines that the eggs have matured, ovulation is triggered by administering a single dose of human chorionic gonadotropin.63 Egg retrieval occurs thirty-four to thirty-six hours after
this injection.64 The donor is placed under anesthesia and her eggs are harvested using transvaginal aspiration.65
B.

Risks and Side Effects Associated with Egg Harvesting

While the long-term risks and effects of egg donation are not yet definitively known, recent studies suggest that the medications used to stop
ovulation and hyperstimulate the ovaries to produce more eggs (Stages 1
and 2) expose egg donors to tremendous risks that may endanger their lives
and compromise their future fertility.66 Within the medical community, there
is significant disagreement about the frequency at which these risks occur
and the potential long-term effects the drug protocols may have upon donors’ health and future fertility.67
61. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 59. This step will hereinafter
be referred to as Stage 1. A commonly used GRHA is Lupron™ (brand name) or Leuprolide
acetate (generic), which is indicated (approved) for “palliative treatment of advanced prostatic cancer.” Table of Approved Indications for GnRH Agonists in Adults, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm209842.htm#table (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
62. See generally IOM Report, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the harvesting process).
This step will hereinafter be referred to as Stage 2.
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. This step will hereinafter be referred to as
Stage 3.
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 10–11.
66. For more information and detailed data findings, see W. Kramer, J. Schneider & N.
Schultz, US Oocyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial Issues, 24
HUMAN REPROD. 3144, 3146 (2009) (noting there are no studies that evaluate the donor’s
long-term risks after ovarian stimulation and the increased incidences of premature ovarian
failure, reduced fertility, and cancer). See also IOM Report, supra note 4, at 11–50.
67. Compare Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0004549/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012)
(stating that OHSS is a complication occasionally seen in women), and Repetitive Oocyte
Donation, PRACTICE COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY
S194, S194 (2008) (positing that “[c]ontrolled ovarian hyperstimulation entails both known
and theoretical risks”), with Christian Jensen, Egg Donation Is Not as Simple as it Sounds,
EVENING STANDARD (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/lifestyle/article24002543-egg-donation-is-not-as-simple-as-it-sounds.do#.Tqrnj_DNNhQ.mailto (discussing
the occurrence of OHSS and linking it to “intensive farming at fertility clinics”).
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Acute Risks

Potential acute risks to egg donors include ovarian hyperstimulation
syndrome (OHSS), anesthesia/surgical mishaps,68 and psychological problems.69 Some clinicians and practitioners believe that OHSS rarely occurs
and, when it does, it is likely linked to “pre-disposing factors,” such as polycystic ovarian syndrome or the age of the donor, which cause the donor’s
ovaries to respond differently to the drug protocols in Stages 1 and 2.70 Others believe that acute risks, particularly OHSS, are linked to the aggressive
stimulation of the ovaries and lack of individualized drug protocols.71 Doctors are often reluctant to cancel or adjust the donor’s drug protocol because
their “patient” is the recipient, rather than the donor; this conflict of interest
may negatively affect the quality of care the donor receives. 72 According to
Dr. Suzanne Parisian, former chief medical officer for the Federal Drug
Administration,
[O]ver-stimulation of the ovary can progress rapidly to a serious lifethreatening condition days after completion of egg collection . . . OHSS
carries an increased risk of clotting disorders, kidney damage, and ovarian twisting. Ovarian stimulation . . . has been associated with serious life
threatening pulmonary conditions in FDA trials including thromboembolic events, pulmonary embolism, pulmonary infarction, cerebral vascular accident (stroke) and arterial occlusion with loss of a limb and death.
Risks of the egg retrieval procedure, although rare, include death, respir-

68. See Stephen J. Bennett et al., Complications of Transvaginal Ultrasound-Directed
Follicle Aspiration: A Review of 2670 Consecutive Procedures, 10 J. OF ASSISTED REPROD. &
GENETICS 72 (1993); Suzanne Parisian, Open Letter from Suzanne Parisian, CENTER FOR
GENETICS & SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2005), http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=181.
69. IOM Report, supra note 4, at 41–49.
70. See Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630.
71. See Annick Delvigne & Serge Rozenberg, Epidemiology and Prevention of Ovarian
Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS): A Review, 8 HUMAN REPROD. UPDATE 559, 561 (2002)
(“[A] significant correlation was found between the baseline number of follicles, the number
of oocytes retrieved, and OHSS. There is no doubt that the incidence of OHSS is related to
the stimulation regimens used.”). See also Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630.
72. See Delvigne & Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 565 (“[P]hysicians may also feel more
reluctant to propose cancellation to patients [who receive the harvested eggs] as IVF implies
a great commitment on the patients’ part in terms of procedures, time and money; moreover,
the physicians are also under pressure to obtain a ‘successful’ outcome and to transfer more
embryos when there is no insurance. . . .”); see also Noah, supra note 14, at 626–28 (citing
W. Gifford-Jones, Multiple Births a Cause for Concern, FIN. POST, Aug. 8, 1998, at R11)
(suggesting that one reason some practitioners overstimulate the donor’s ovaries is because it
is more effective (more eggs are produced) and more profitable.).
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atory or cardiac arrest, brain damage, paraplegia, paralysis, loss of function of a limb or organ, hemorrhage, allergic reaction, and infection.73

A number of recent studies suggest that the occurrence of OHSS is
substantially higher than previously reported,74 and it is directly linked to
“the total number of developing follicles and to the number of collected
oocytes.”75 However, experts disagree on the frequency with which OHSS
occurs, with estimates ranging from less than one percent to nearly thirty
percent.76 It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely determine how often
acute complications result from egg harvesting because providers are not
required to report incidents of OHSS, and many providers do not follow up
with the donors after their eggs are harvested.77
2.

Long-term Risks

Long-term risks of egg donation largely remain a mystery because
there are no clinical trials that have studied the long-term effects of egg donation upon the donor, suggesting that many donors did not have sufficient
information to give informed consent.78 Potential long-term side effects cur73. Parisian, supra note 68. Accord IOM Report, supra note 4, at 18–19. See also Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, PRACTICE COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., 90
FERTILITY & STERILITY S188, S191 (2008); Arthur C. Fleischer, MD, Ovarian Torsion,
MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2026938-overview (last updated Sept. 26, 2011) (explaining that “[o]varian torsion is encountered more often in women
who have had ovarian stimulation”).
74. See Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146 (reporting on their research efforts surveying 287 donors); see also IOM Report, supra note 4, at 17–22.
75. See Delvigne & Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 564 (“[N]o patient developed severe
OHSS when fewer than 20 oocytes were collected,” but it should be noted that the risk of
developing OHSS rose substantially when more than thirty oocytes were extracted.); see also
Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 630; Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome, supra note
73, at S188 (noting that risk rises with number of oocytes retrieved).
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2168
(noting that the statistics did not include the donors whose cycles were cancelled due to the
risk of OHSS and that the occurrence of complications was based upon whether or not the
donor came back for an office visit, suggesting that the risks of OHSS are probably higher
than reported); see also Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146. For example, a recent study
that surveyed egg donors ten years after their eggs were harvested reported that thirty percent
of participants reported OHSS complications and nearly ten percent reported infertility issues. See id.
77. In some cases, women file medical malpractice suits against the clinic or doctors
performing the oocyte retrieval and later settle before trial. See, e.g., Papademas, supra note
23, at *1; Kramer et al., supra note 66, at 3146; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2168;
Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 631.
78. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2–e3 (“‘Virtually all of the published reports
have suggested that given time, an association between the exogenous gonadotropins and
various cancers may eventually be demonstrated” and “[t]here has been little attention fo-
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rently identified include breast, ovarian, and endometrial cancers as well as
infertility.79 Clinicians’ efforts to demonstrate a link between the drug protocols used and a higher risk of cancer have been stymied by the lack of donor
data and the high costs associated with managing a large, long-term surveillance program.80 Several studies monitored donors for possible side effects,
but they have drawn ambiguous conclusions, partly because the surveillance
period was less than twenty years, making it difficult to draw meaningful
conclusions about long-term risks to the donors from the data collected.81
C.

Eggs Used for Reproductive Purposes

In the United States, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is the primary method
used to assist infertile couples that want to conceive a genetic child.82 In
vitro fertilization refers to the process of removing eggs from a woman, fertilizing the eggs in the lab, and implanting (or transferring) the resulting
embryos into the recipient’s uterus several days later.83 The first baby conceived using IVF was born in 1978 in England; three years later, the first
IVF child in the United States was born in California.84 Since that time, IVF
utilization has increased rapidly;85 however only a handful of states have any
legislation explicitly addressing compensation of IVF egg donors.86

cused on the long-term effects of assisted reproductive technologies . . . most IVF protocols
include luteal phase support for several weeks with supplemental progestogens, which raises
concern since these agents have been linked in several studies to increase in breast cancer
risk.’”); see also Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2166 (“To our knowledge, only one study
has been performed on the rate of serious complications of [OHSS] and oocyte retrieval that
specifically are experienced by oocyte donors.”).
79. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 22–26.
80. See id. at 22–28; Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2.
81. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e1; Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation for IVF and
Stem Cell Research: Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health, DIFFERENT TAKES 2
(Spring 2005),
http://popdev.hampshire.edu/sites/popdev/files/uploads/dt/DifferenTakes_33.pdf (“One of the
more serious issues . . . is the absence of any good quality long term safety data on the infertility drugs commonly used. There are hundreds if not thousands of anecdotal reports, where
complications were NOT short-lived . . . . ‘The FDA says it has not tracked claims of such
long-term effects.’”(emphasis added)).
82. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30 (Spreadsheet of Clinic Tables
and Data Dictionary).
83. “Transfer rate” refers to the number of embryos implanted in a recipient’s womb. 81
FERTILITY & STERILITY S21, S21–22 (2004).
84. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 15, at 41.
85. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that in 1986, there were only fortyone IVF clinics in the United States).
86. See infra notes 125, 127 and accompanying text.
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Donor eggs are most commonly used by women who are between thirty-seven and forty-five years of age.87 The likelihood of pregnancy increases
if more than one egg is transferred, but doing so greatly increases the probability that multiple infant births88 or other complications may occur.89 Because ART is expensive and recipients are often limited by the number of
cycles they can afford, there is substantial pressure on physicians and clinics
to maximize a recipient’s chance of getting pregnant on the first attempt. 90
This situation suggests that the egg donor’s quality of care may be compromised because the physician’s primary concern is to satisfy his client, the
recipient; this conflict of interest may make it difficult to simultaneously act
in the donor’s best interests.91 The conflict of interest is even greater when
the supervising physician has an ownership interest in the fertility clinic and
plays an active role in determining compensation and the standard of care
for egg donors; there is a substantial incentive to cut costs and maximize
profits.92
Over the last thirty years, the costs associated with IVF have steadily
increased as the technology and rate of success have improved.93 Additionally, the cost per IVF cycle is much higher in the United States than other
countries.94 The average cost of an IVF cycle is $12,400, while the cost of a
live birth ranges between $66,667 and $114,286.95 Despite this, demand has
remained high, and continues to increase every year.96 Unlike many other
developed countries that have adopted publicly funded health care plans that
cover infertility treatments, the United States does not yet have a comprehensive healthcare solution that includes fertility treatments.97 Because few
87. See 2009 ART Report, supra note 34, at 60–61.
88. See id at 63.
89. See id. at 59, 63.
90. Marius Meintjes et al., The Balance Between Optimizing Recipient Pregnancy Outcomes and Aggressive Oocyte Donor Stimulation, 80 FERTILITY & STERILITY S174, S174–75
(2003).
91. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper
Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 633 (1997).
92. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
93. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 229 (2006) (noting that the cost of a live birth born to
an older woman may be as high as $151,000 to $223,000); see also Nizan Geslevich Packin,
The Other Side of Health Care Reform: An Analysis of the Missed Opportunity Regarding
Infertility Treatments, 14 SCHOLAR 1, 20 (2011).
94. Mark P. Connolly et al., The Costs and Consequences of Assisted Reproductive
Technology: An Economic Perspective, 16 HUMAN REPROD. UPDATE 603, 604 (2010) (discussing the fact that the U.S. performed the largest number of ART cycles in the world but
has one of the lowest utilization rates).
95. See SPAR, supra note 93, at 229.
96. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 15, at 43–49.
97. See Packin, supra note 93, at 8.
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healthcare plans cover fertility treatments,98 IVF costs are primarily paid
out-of-pocket, often making it “too expensive for more than a single try,”
increasing pressure on the physician or clinic to achieve a successful result.99
D.

Eggs Used for Stem Cell Research

Stem cell research offers the possibility of providing cures for diseases
that result from failing organ systems, such as Type I Diabetes and Parkinson’s as well as generating replacement tissue through cell-based therapies.100 The majority of extant legislation regarding stem cells deals with
regulating or restricting human cloning.101 Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer
(SCNT) is a recently developed human cloning technology, which consumes
enormous quantities of freshly harvested eggs in the research process. 102
The societal, cultural, and legal resistance to human cloning103 and genetic
engineering forces researchers to rely upon embryos left over from altruistic
IVF egg donations.104 However, the “existing demand for reproductive oocytes far outstrips availability,” thus, SCNT research places tremendous
additional pressure on the global egg market.105
Eggs are harvested for stem cell research using the same procedure and
drug protocols as used for IVF purposes;106 however, “prevailing social and
98. See id. at 21 (“[B]ecause coverage for infertility treatments is much more controversial, in most states there is currently no coverage for infertility treatments at all. Only fifteen
states mandate insurance coverage for infertility treatments, and specifically, only two states
require that coverage actually be offered.”).
99. See id. at 20–21.
100. IOM Report, supra note 4, at 1.
101. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.
102. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 21; Emily Galpern, Beyond Embryo Politics: Women’s Health and Dignity in Stem Cell Research, Women’s Health Activist Newsletter, NAT’L
WOMEN’S HEALTH NETWORK (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://nwhn.org/beyond-embryo-politicswomens-health-and-dignity-stem-cell-research (explaining that the “huge number of eggs
needed and the enormous costs required” make it unfeasible at this time, although scientists
acknowledge that SCNT is more likely to be used to study diseases at the cellular level”).
103. S. Camporesi & G. Boniolo, Fearing a Non-existing Minotaur? The Ethical Challenges of Research on Cytoplasmic Hybrid Embryos, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 821, 823 (2008)
(discussing the possibilities of human-animal hybrids and society’s repugnance towards this
research, but arguing that the severe shortage of human oocytes necessitates using animal
oocytes which is “an ethically more acceptable alternative”).
104. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 7 (“For this research to move forward . . . [it] will
require a steady supply of stem cells, particularly human embryonic stem cells. . . . Thus
much of the promise of stem cells depends on women choosing to donate oocytes to the
research effort.”).
105. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 2.
106. Mertes & Pennings, supra note 23, at 629 (stating that “[a]n oocyte donor for stem
cell research is subjected to the same treatment as an oocyte donor in the reproductive setting,
but the aim of the donation is to advance medical knowledge rather than to establish a pregnancy”). Accord Sandra A. Carson, Proposed Oocyte Donation Guidelines for Stem Cell
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political attitudes impose different standards on eggs” used for reproduction
as compared to those used for research.107 Whereas “younger women with
particular backgrounds are almost exclusively sought after” for eggs used
for reproductive purposes,108 donors for research can be much more diverse
because “researchers only require that [their] oocytes contain healthy cytoplasm.”109 While IVF egg donors receive compensation, with the exception
of New York, egg donors for research do not.110
In contrast to eggs used for IVF purposes, which are used to create new
life, eggs used for human embryonic stem cell research are destroyed when
the egg’s nucleus is removed to permit the scientist to insert the nucleus of a
somatic cell into the egg cell, thereby reprogramming it.111 Donors’ reluctance to have their eggs used for research, combined with the vast number of
eggs required for SCNT, aggravate concerns that researchers or fertility
physicians will resort to unethical means to obtain the eggs necessary for
their research.112 These attitudes and beliefs shaped states’ current legislaResearch, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2503, 2505 (2010) (outlining protocols for ovarian
stimulation).
107. Bercovici, supra note 15, at 196; see IOM Report, supra note 4, at 4 (“Research
donors, for example, are likely to be drawn from a much broader range of women than IVF
patients, who tend to be primarily Caucasian women in middle to upper socioeconomic
groups.”); Eric D. Levens & Alan H. DeCherney, Human Oocyte Research: The Ethics of
Donation and Donor Protection, 300 JAMA 2174, 2175 (2008) (citing Ethics Committee of
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007)).
108. See Foohey, supra note 14, at 903.
109. Sarah B. Angel, The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis of Risk and Reward in
Stem Cell Research, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 183, 198 (2007).
110. IOM Report, supra note 4, at XII (“Human embryonic stem cells are currently derived primarily from unwanted or ‘surplus’ (donated) human embryos from patients who
have undergone treatments for infertility.”); Bercovici, supra note 15, at 197; Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Informed Consent and the Use of
Gametes and Embryos for Research, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S251, S251 (2004); see also
Zacher, supra note 14, at 341.
111. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of
Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1060–61
(2006).
112. See Waldby, supra note 49, at 10 (discussing discredited Professor Hwang Woo
Suk’s research in South Korea). Hwang made international headlines in 2004 when his team
was the first to harvest stem cells from cloned human embryos, but later admitted to using
several of his junior staff members as egg donors and purchasing human eggs from twenty
other women in violation of medical ethics standards. Id.; see also Colleen C. Campbell,
“Supreme Scientist” Superstar: The Hwang Scandal Highlights the Ethical Dangers of
ESCR,
NAT’L
REVIEW
(Dec.
2,
2005),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216148/supreme-scientist-superstar/colleen-carrollcampbell (discussing the Hwang scandal and the “research-at-all-costs mentality”).
Many embryonic-stem-cell-research activists . . . discount concerns about the
demand for eggs leading to ethical breaches and the exploitation of women. Sci-
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tion—most of which prohibits compensation for eggs used for research
while remaining silent about compensation for IVF donors.113
The dichotomy demonstrated by existing legislation reflects the contradictory standards applied to eggs used for reproductive purposes (IVF) versus eggs used for research. Some statutes allow payment for IVF eggs, but
not for research eggs, while some require strict documentation and tracking
requirements for research eggs, but have no guidelines for monitoring the
harvesting and implantation of eggs used in IVF procedures.114
III. REGULATION OF EGG DONATION AND STEM CELL RESEARCH WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES
A survey of existing state laws115 regulating the practice of egg donation, stem cell research, and human cloning within the United States reveals
a loose patchwork of legislation that, in the majority of states, is unregulated.116 The lack of legislation in these states creates an environment in which
unethical brokers, clinics, or providers may operate without any regulatory
oversight.117

entists can be trusted to comply with agreed-upon professional and government
standards, they say. Yet when the world’s leading stem-cell researcher admits
that the frenetic pursuit of promised cures made the temptation to cheat too great,
they dismiss his behavior as irrelevant to the debate about his research. In fact,
Hwang’s lies and lapses are a clear illustration of the ethical problems created by
embryonic-stem-cell research: the immense demand for human eggs that threatens to transform desperately poor women into reluctant egg donors; the risks to
those women of illness, infertility, and death that may go unmentioned by researchers seeking their eggs; and the dire consequences for a culture that makes a
commodity of human eggs, human embryos, and human life itself.
Campbell, supra.
113. See infra Part III.
114. See infra Part III; Fifty State Survey, supra note 5. See also Bercovici, supra note 15,
at 194.
115. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.
116. See Helen M. Alvaré, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 25 (2003); Bridget M. Fuselier, The
Trouble with Putting All Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a Property Rights Model to Resolve
Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 183 (2009)
(“[W]hile some states ha[ve] made attempts at addressing ethical concerns of ART, there is
lack of uniformity among states, with many providing little to no regulation.”); Hansen, supra note 18, at 54 (discussing the “crazy quilt of laws” in the United States, which “unlike
many countries, has no national policies governing assisted reproductive technology”); see
also Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.
117. See supra notes 16–18, 23–24 and accompanying text.
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Overview of Stem Cell Legislation

Currently, only Georgia, Idaho, and Iowa explicitly permit stem cell research.118 Eighteen states specifically prohibit human cloning, but are silent
about other types of stem cell research, a reflection of society’s repugnance
towards this type of research.119 Eleven of these states include a scienter
requirement, thus preventing criminal prosecution unless a person knowingly or intentionally performs human cloning.120 Two states—Arizona and
Louisiana—do not prohibit human cloning, but specify that public funds
shall not be used for SCNT research.121
B.

Overview of Egg Donation Legislation

A survey of existing legislation on eggs used for reproductive purposes
demonstrates the wide variety of approaches taken by the states while highlighting the substantial disparity in market regulation based upon the intended use of the eggs.122 Only three states—Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma—expressly prohibit the sale of human eggs for compensation under any
circumstances.123 While a blanket prohibition on compensation provides
women the most protection from exploitation, commodification, and longterm side effects yet to be identified, this approach is politically divisive
because it puts lawmakers in a Solomon-like position of choosing to protect
some women while denying others the fundamental right to procreate. The
fact that only three states have been successful in implementing this approach attests to the monumental effort needed to overcome this objection.
States that have attempted to pass similar legislation have failed to gain the
necessary consensus to enact the proposed law.124
At the opposite side of the spectrum, Indiana, Florida, and Virginia explicitly permit compensation and reimbursement of the donor’s expenses for
egg donation for IVF purposes.125 This broad approach permits “reasonable
compensation” for the donor’s medical expenses, hospital expenses, travel,

118. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.
119. See id. at Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Virginia.
120. See id. at Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.
121. See id. at Arizona, and Louisiana.
122. See generally supra note 5.
123. See id. at Georgia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.
124. See, e.g., H.B. 2907, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2011).
125. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Florida, Indiana, and Virginia.
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and recovery time.126 This approach has been criticized for permitting donors to be compensated for their eggs without implementing adequate guidelines, such as specifying standards for informed consent and defining reasonable compensation so that courts have a tool to evaluate these transactions. The lack of guidance may encourage egg trafficking, or at the very
least, induce vulnerable women to donate their eggs without fully understanding the risks.127 Fourteen states prohibit egg donation for research purposes but are silent on eggs used for reproductive purposes.128 This approach
seeks a compromise between prohibiting donor compensation and allowing
donors to be compensated for reasonable expenses. However, this approach
provides no guidance to courts, practitioners, clinics, or doctors regarding
what expenses are considered “reasonable expenses.” The lack of legislation
also makes it extremely difficult for donors to seek recourse when they experience complications or serious injuries because the courts have difficulty
fashioning a remedy without regulatory or legislative guidelines that dictate
the industry standard that brokers, clinics, and providers must adhere to.129
Because the donor signs a contract to donate her eggs and consents to the
extraction procedure, she generally cannot win a suit against the fertility
provider or clinic unless she has suffered from an egregious error or gross
misconduct.130 Another problem arises when donors become aware of recently discovered serious side effects or long-term risks of which they were
not informed of prior to the extraction.131
126. See id. at Indiana, Florida, and Virginia. Many states use a similar “actual expenses
incurred” model to compensate surrogates. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88
N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1766 (2010).
127. See Ruth Macklin, What is Wrong with Commodification, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING
BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 106, 107–19 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996); Murray,
supra note 7, at 60–67.
128. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and Virginia.
129. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. 2005); see also supra note 23
and accompanying text. For a review ASRM guidelines, see supra note 24 and accompanying
text. See also John A. Robertson, Commerce and Regulation in the Assisted Reproduction
Industry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 665, 682 (2007) (“An efficient system of reproductive technology
needs an infrastructure of legal rules for how technology affects ownership and control of
gametes and embryos and the rearing rights and duties in the offspring generated by ART.”).
130. See supra notes 23, 78 and accompanying text.
131. See IOM Report, supra note 4, at 22–26; Maxwell et al., supra note 40, at 2166;
Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2–e3; Judy Norsigian, Egg Donation for IVF and Stem Cell
Research: Time to Weigh the Risks to Women’s Health, DIFFERENT TAKES 2 (Spring 2005),
http://popdev.hampshire.edu/sites/popdev/files/uploads/dt/DifferenTakes_33.pdf (“One of the
more serious issues . . . is the absence of any good quality long term safety data on the infertility drugs commonly used. There are hundreds if not thousands of anecdotal reports, where
complications were NOT short-lived. . . . ‘The FDA says it has not tracked claims of such
long-term effects. . . .’” (emphasis added)).
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Some states, such as Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, prohibit the sale of eggs obtained from human fetuses but do not address eggs donated by adult donors.132 This legislation fails to address how
eggs obtained from sources other than fetuses should be treated and what
guidelines apply to those transactions. The remaining states either have no
legislation dealing with selling human eggs for IVF purposes or only prohibit human eggs being used for research (human cloning) without addressing
eggs used for reproductive purposes.133 This absence of legislation leaves the
field open for unethical providers, brokers, and clinics to operate, while additionally failing to provide courts with clear guidelines to evaluate these
transactions. This is perhaps the most damaging approach for donors, as the
absence of legislation defining acceptable conduct increases the probability
that women will be injured or exploited.134
C.

Gaps in Existing Legislation and Suggested Model Approach

Based on the above overview, it is readily apparent that a wide variety
of approaches exist within the United States that address stem cell research,
human cloning, and egg donation for IVF purposes. One state—California—
provides a legislative solution to address eggs used for IVF reproduction,
human cloning, and stem cell research, while providing donors recourse if
the legislative guidelines are not adhered to.135 California’s legislation package is not comprehensive; significant gaps still exist. However, its legislative approach addresses many of the fundamentals needed to protect both
donors and recipients from unethical conduct and can provide guidance to
other states seeking to implement a more comprehensive legislative solution
in their jurisdictions.
First, California mandates informed consent, written and oral, prior to
egg retrieval.136 The statute delineates the format and substance of the consent.137 The statute enumerates disclosure requirements that include “medically accurate” information detailing the potential risks associated with “the
surgical procedure and . . . the drugs, medications, and hormones prescribed
for ovarian stimulation during the AOP [assisted oocyte production] pro132. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island.
133. See supra Part III.A; see also Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at Arizona, Florida,
Indiana, Louisiana, and Virginia.
134. See supra notes 23, 78 and accompanying text.
135. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California.
136. See id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125335 (West, Westlaw through 2012
Legis. Sess.).
137. See id. (mandating that providers disclose a “standardized medically accurate written
summary of health and consumer issues associated with [assisted oocyte production] and any
alternative methods of oocyte retrieval”).

2012]

EGGS FOR SALE

209

cess,” requiring providers to educate donors about “alternative method[s] of
oocyte retrieval,” and listing “additional . . . medical information on health
and safety issues surrounding oocyte retrieval.”138
However, this statute only addresses eggs used for research, i.e., those
used “for the purpose of procuring oocytes for research or the development
of medical therapies,” but does not explicitly require the same consent procedures for eggs used for reproductive purposes.139 This gap should be
closed by requiring informed consent for all egg retrievals—regardless of
the purpose for which the eggs are used.
Also, unlike Virginia, California does not mandate compliance with
federal screening requirements for donated reproductive tissue, and, unlike
New Hampshire, California also does not mandate that potential donors be
given a general medical evaluation.140 Donors may be unaware that they
have physiological problems, genetic diseases, or may be predisposed for
certain diseases.141 This is significant because recipients rely upon providers,
clinics, and egg broker agencies to screen potential donors for pre-existing
genetic diseases; thus, failure to mandate testing guidelines could expose
recipients and their families to the unanticipated risks of having a child with
a serious medical condition that impacts the child’s quality of life or life
expectancy.142 Because most courts currently treat human eggs/embryos as a
good regulated by contract, as opposed to a property interest or a child, this
suggests that future donors who intentionally misrepresent or hide preexisting conditions or diseases may be subject to UCC-based liability, while
also implying that recipients may have a cause of action against the provider
or clinic for failure to properly screen potential donors and for lack of informed consent regarding potential risks associated with the eggs implanted.143

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.75–.90 (2004) (listing what tests and diseases potential donors
and donated reproductive material must be screened for); Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). The federal requirements
have not been enforced against egg brokers or agencies that contract with physicians or fertility clinics who actually harvest and implant the donated egg. See supra Part I.
141. See Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 425–57 (2008) (discussing liability issues egg
donors may encounter).
142. Id. at 408.
143. See Jayanti, supra note 141, at 435; Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 43–49; see
generally Levens & DeCherney, supra note 107, at 2175 (discussing informed consent and
possible negative effects the donor may suffer).
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Second, California specifically prohibits egg harvesting if the surgeon
performing the procedure has a financial interest in the outcome.144 This
conflict of interest provision is important in light of the fact that many researchers have a financial stake in their research.145 Additionally, most current statutes fail to address the issue of providers or clinics who have a financial interest in egg harvesting for reproductive purposes.146 For this reason, a statute that fails to address this conflict of interest leaves a substantial
gap because many providers have an ownership interest in the fertility clinics where they practice (and may also have ownership interests in egg donation or surrogacy agencies to which they refer patients).147 Most physicians
do not disclose this information to their patients, thus providing “the perfect
cover for extortion and criminal activity.”148 Requiring all clinics, surgeons,
and providers to disclose any conflicts of interest or financial interests to
both the donor and recipient could close this gap.
Third, California mandates that egg donors who contribute their eggs
for research purposes may only be compensated for direct expenses, such as
travel costs, medical expenses, and recovery time.149 Permitting donors to be
compensated but limiting reimbursement to direct expenses is an excellent
way to restrict compensation amounts without completely prohibiting egg
donation.150 However, California does not limit the dollar amount of compensation or provide guidelines for compensating IVF egg donors.151 Cali144. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125344
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
145. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Hwang scandal in South Korea is an
extreme example of the ethical violations that may occur when this restriction is not expressly mandated. California deemed this issue important enough to codify a mandate that researchers have no financial interest in the outcome of their research. See Fifty State Survey,
supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125344 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.) (The physician or surgeon performing oocyte retrieval shall not have a “financial interest in the outcome of the research.”); see also Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, INT’L SOC’Y FOR STEM CELL RES. 5–8 (2006),
http://www.ite.gr/_gfx/pdf/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf.
146. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 75 (“There is a clear conflict of interest when doctors
and brokers are able to play the role of both profit-taking middleman and health-care provider.”); Pam Madsen, Should Infertility Doctors Disclose Conflicts of Interest?, THE FERTILITY
ADVOCATE
(May
29,
2011),
http://www.thefertilityadvocate.com/asrm-ethicscommittee/should-infertility-doctors-disclose-conflicts-of-interest/.
147. See Lahl, supra note 16 (discussing her observations of the relationships between
fertility doctors and egg donation agencies or brokers they have a financial interest in).
148. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 75.
149. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125355
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
150. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
151. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at California. For example, one of the well
documented cases occurred when an egg broker solicited at Stanford University. The young
woman, Papademas, was in her PhD program at Stanford when she suffered a stroke a few
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fornia has more IVF clinics than any other state in the United States and the
vast majority of donated eggs are used for IVF purposes;152 this leaves a
significant gap in which bad actors may use compensation to exploit donors.
As discussed previously, failure to address compensation parameters and set
forth legislative guidelines for eggs used for research and for reproductive
purposes increases the probability that women will be exploited or unfairly
induced to sell their eggs.
Fourth, California is the only state in the nation to address agencies or
entities that utilize predatory advertising.153 The guidelines set forth by the
ASRM Ethics Committee state that “[a]lthough there is no consensus on the
precise payment that oocyte donors should receive, at this time sums of
$5,000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 are not appropriate.”154 The reality is that professionals do not adhere to these guidelines,
as evidenced by many of the advertisements that offer exorbitant compensation for “exotic” donors that have particular characteristics such as SAT
scores over 1400, height of 5’7” or more, blond hair, and an Ivy League
education.155 Thus, legislation that mandates adherence to ASRM guidelines
is a powerful tool for prosecutors and donors in dealing with unethical brokers and agencies because it provides the donor with a legal recourse while
giving the courts a “stick” to punish violators.156
days after taking the ovulation stimulation drugs. Egg brokers target Ivy League schools and
offer $35,000 to $100,000 for these eggs. See Papademas, supra note 23, at *1.
152. See 2009 Clinic Tables and Data Dictionary, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ARTReports.htm (last visited Jun. 8, 2012).
153. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125325
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.). Predatory advertising combined with the prevalent lack of truly informed consent about the long-term risks of egg harvesting creates a very
dangerous situation for potential donors, who are often vulnerable women with significant
financial obligations. See Jennifer J. Black, Egg Donation: Issues & Concerns, 35 AM. J.
MATERNAL CHILD NURSING 132, 134 (2010) (citing a previous study noting evidence that
“oocyte donor programs may in fact be minimizing or misrepresenting the existence of risk to
prospective donors”); Levine, supra note 22, at 27–33 (discussing predatory advertising).
154. See Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra
note 107 at 305, 308.
155. Levine, supra note 22, at 27–33 (analyzing advertisements by egg brokers, agencies,
and individuals and concluding that the majority of the advertisements violate ASRM guidelines by offering compensation well above recommended guidelines). Exotic donors, i.e.,
those with high SAT scores, Ivy League educations, and particular physical attributes (blue
eyes, blond hair, height of 5'7" or more) could be offered as much as fifty to one hundred
thousand dollars for their eggs, calling “into question the notion that the current selfregulatory framework provides appropriate ethical protections for oocyte donors.” Id. at 27;
see also Helen M. Alvaré, supra note 116 at 13–14 (discussing several widely publicized
advertisements for exotic donors).
156. The full power of this tool remains to be seen. There are two class action lawsuits
pending on this issue in California—the first in the nation. See Brief for Petitioner, Levy v.
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. C11-03803, 2011 WL 3373300 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011);
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Fifth, California requires that eggs extracted for research purposes must
comply with legislative guidelines whether they were procured in-state or
out-of-state.157 These requirements include keeping a written record of every
oocyte used for research,158 creating an anonymous registry of embryos
available for research,159 prohibiting researchers and their immediate family
members from “being a subject in the research,”160 and requiring that an
institutional review board (IRB) monitor the research.161 This legislation is
also important because it implicitly recognizes some of the ethical issues
that have occurred when researchers have imported eggs from other states or
other countries to avoid compliance with local regulatory guidelines.162
Sixth, California implemented several statutes that address the disposition of oocytes and attempt to honor the donor’s preferences regarding the
disposition of any unused genetic material.163 This is significant because
much of the litigation thus far has been related to errors (eggs were destroyed, improperly preserved, or implanted into the wrong person) or misconduct (eggs were intentionally destroyed or shared with multiple recipients to increase profits without the donor’s knowledge).164 Most importantly,
California provides a legal recourse and a criminal penalty for providers that

Brief for Petitioner, Kamakahi, v. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., No. CV-11-1781-JCS, 2011
WL 1374902 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011). These cases were consolidated on March 14, 2012.
See Kamakahi v. Am. Soc. for Reprod. Med., No. C11-01781 SBA, 2012 WL 892163, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012).
157. Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125346 (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
158. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125342 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
159. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §125305 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
160. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125343 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.).
161. Id. at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125341 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis.
Sess.); see also Int’l Soc’y for Stem Cell Res., Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic
Stem
Cell
Research,
5–8
(Dec.
21,
2006),
http://www.ite.gr/_gfx/pdf/ISSCRhESCguidelines2006.pdf.
162. See CARNEY, supra note 3, at 113; Int’l Soc’y for Stem Cell Res., supra note 161, at
8 (citing the need for institutional review of oocytes procured for research to “ensure that
vulnerable populations are not exploited due to their dependent status or comprised ability to
offer fully voluntary consent”).
163. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125345 (West,
Westlaw through 2012 Legis. Sess.), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260 (West, Westlaw
through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
164. See supra notes 23, 77 and accompanying text.
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intentionally or knowingly misuse donated reproductive material in express
violation of the donor’s wishes.165
Finally, California’s legislation does not address quality control issues,
which opens up the possibility of consumer exploitation.166 Because IVF
procedures involve complex technology that often has a low rate of success
depending on the recipient’s health and various physiological factors, it is
possible for clinics and practitioners to take advantage of a consumer’s ignorance regarding the differences in the quality of treatment, the technology
available, and the provider’s level of experience.167 Consumers are often
unaware that the provider’s expertise and the technology used during the
ART procedure may also be linked to birth defects or other serious health
issues.168 Additionally, in smaller states such as Arkansas, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, or Idaho, there may only be one fertility clinic
in the state; thus, there is no competition, much less any oversight that might
serve to protect consumers.169
For example, a small fertility practitioner may grade a certain set of
embryos as “excellent,” while a well-established clinic located in a large
metropolitan area may grade the same embryos as “fair.” 170 This disparity in
“product quality” combined with the natural opacity of the clinic’s practices
and available technology increases the likelihood of fraud.171 Because consumers in these circumstances are unaware that the disparity in quality exists, much less the difference in skill or practical knowledge between clinics,
they may spend thousands of dollars for a procedure carried out with nonviable eggs.172
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
While the initial visceral reaction by many has been to push for a legal
ban on compensation for egg donors as a means of eliminating exploitation
or commodification of donors or of human eggs, the fact is that Louisiana is
the only state to adopt this approach; all other states that have attempted to
165. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5, at CAL. PENAL CODE § 367g(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2012 Legis. Sess.).
166. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 22–25 (discussing the need for establishing
clear quality control standards).
167. See Heled, supra note 15, at 281 (noting that ART consumers are the “least informed
and least equipped party” to assess the risks in the ART procedure).
168. See id. at 277.
169. See Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 30, at Spreadsheet of Clinic Tables and Data Dictionary.
170. Interview with Jane Doe, Attorney (Oct. 20, 2011). The interviewee requested that
her full name be omitted to protect her privacy.
171. See Jim Hawkins, Financing Fertility, 47. HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 135 (2010).
172. See id.
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adopt similar legislation have not been successful.173 At the other end of the
spectrum, only three states have been able to pass legislation permitting the
donor to be compensated for her eggs regardless of the intended purpose.174
In between these two positions are the states that have no legislation addressing eggs used for research or IVF purposes, and California’s legislative
approach, which prohibits compensation for research, but is silent on eggs
used for IVF purposes.175 At the same time, the federal government has
shown an unwillingness to impose sweeping legislation on the states, create
new agencies to regulate this industry, or modify the regulatory authority of
existing agencies, such as the Federal Drug Administration or the Centers
for Disease and Prevention Control.176
The solution to this issue must be multi-faceted and must take into consideration the underlying moral and ethical concerns, balanced by an understanding of how the global market for eggs is exerting pressure on the market for eggs within the United States.177 A comprehensive legislative package is needed in each state that addresses eggs used for research and those
used for IVF purposes, closing the major gaps that unethical actors could
exploit to their benefit.
A better alternative would be for each state to allow reasonable compensation for donors of eggs for either purpose, while mandating informed
consent and full disclosure of known risks from the surgical procedure and
the drug protocols used.178 States could specify acceptable ranges of compensation and enforce compliance through a statutory mechanism. Federally
mandated incentives could be applied to encourage states to adopt this approach.179 Additionally, if a national registry were created for IVF donors,
like those already being used to monitor embryos used for stem cell research, this would facilitate surveillance efforts by requiring providers and
clinics to track the disposition of each oocyte utilized and retain donors’
medical records, thus aiding researchers attempting to track long-term side

173. See, e.g., H.B. 2907, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2011).
174. See Fifty State Survey, supra note 5.
175. See supra notes 133, 149 and accompanying text.
176. See Reich & Swink, supra note 14, at 25 (citing Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing
the Market for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs but Not
Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 645–46 (2008) (“With practically every aspect of human-to-human tissue transfer in the United States regulated, the lack of regulatory
control over human egg donation in particular . . . speaks volumes about the acceptance of a
free market approach to ART.”)).
177. See also Waldby, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
179. E.g., S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987) (holding Congress can encourage states to adhere to federal regulations by conditioning receipt of federal monies upon
compliance, which would create uniformity in the states).
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effects.180 Currently, no records are kept of how many times donors donate
their eggs.181 Often, clinics do not keep donors’ medical records, making it
difficult for donors to seek recourse if they experience complications and
making it impossible for researchers to effectively monitor donors for longterm side effects such as infertility and increased risk of cancer.182 Finally,
states should enact legislation prohibiting predatory advertising and mandating compliance with ASRM recommended guidelines.183 Enacting such legislation would give donors a remedy that the courts could enforce, while
also protecting young donors who may not realize the risk of cancer and
other long-term effects are much higher with repetitive donations.184
If there is no national consensus on how to address this issue, unethical
entities and providers will continue to take advantage of existing gaps in
legislation to exploit women.
V. CONCLUSION
There are no easy answers to these thorny problems. ART technology
has existed for over thirty years, yet there is very little legislation enacted to
protect women from exploitation, indicating that the most common legislative response to this complex issue is to make no decision in the hopes that
the problem will resolve itself in time. The ‘bad actors’ that are present in
any such ill-defined or poorly regulated arenas are currently exploiting the
lack of regulation, as well as making a lucrative business of performing
risky procedures on women who are unaware of the long-term dangers to
their health and fertility. States must take action to address eggs used for
research and IVF purposes. Only a comprehensive legislative solution has
any hope of mitigating abuses while giving injured women a legislative recourse.
Kitty L. Cone*

180. See Guidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, supra
note 161, at 11.
181. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e2.
182. See Sunni Yuen, An Information Privacy Approach to Regulating the Middlemen in
the Lucrative Gametes Market, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 527, 550 (2007) (“Since sperm and ova
banks are not physicians, they do not have any ‘medical or legal obligation to maintain these
records,’ which means that middlemen are not subject to scrutiny” for failure to maintain
donor records or safeguard the integrity of these records.).
183. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
184. See Schneider, supra note 13, at 1.e3.
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